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AWAKENING CANADA'S DORMANT TRADE AND COMMERCE
CLAUSE: How CANADIAN COURTS TEST CONCURRENT
PROVINCIAL LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you manufacture a unique style of furniture in U.S.
State Z. Only State X harvests the lumber you require. State X
passes an ordinance requiring State X suppliers to sell this lumber
exclusively to State X residents. The State X legislature claims it
passed the ordinance to conserve its precious forestry resource.
Because your business will be ruined unless you move to State
X, you challenge the ordinance in court. The court strikes the or-
dinance because it violates the dormant commerce clause.' On its
face, the ordinance has a legitimate purpose-to conserve a state
resource. Conservation, however, is an incidental purpose to that
of shielding residents from competition in the use of unique lum-
ber. The state legislature could have used means less burdensome
on interstate commerce than completely blocking lumber exports
at the state border. Moreover, the legislature's solution is not
evenhanded for residents and nonresidents. Rather, it discrimi-
nates against nonresidents.
Imagine now you are a resident of Canadian Province Z.
Only Province X grows the trees you need. Province X bans ex-
portation of the trees outside its borders. In the ensuing litigation,
the court strikes the ordinance, noting the language of the Cana-
dian Constitution, which prohibits provinces from discriminating
when supplying other provinces with natural resources.
Assume further the U.S. or Canadian ordinance sets size
specifications for all trucks used to ship lumber on the state's or
province's highways. In the name of maintaining the highways, the
legislature declares a ten ton weight limit on trucks. Plaintiff truck
driver submits conclusive evidence that the heaviest truck in use, a
fifteen ton truck, does no more damage than lighter trucks.
A U.S. court will likely strike the ordinance because it forces
1. Courts use the dormant commerce clause, a non-textual constitutional provision,
to test state legislation that affects interstate commerce.
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out-of-state drivers to supplement their fleets with trucks that
meet State X standards. The burden outweighs the debatable state
benefit. The Canadian court, however, might determine that the
regulation does not burden interprovincial commerce in the supply
of lumber. This contrary result may occur because Canadian Con-
stitutional law lacks a dormant commerce clause analysis to reign
Canadian legislation. Thus, the court might end its inquiry there
and sustain the ordinance.
Even with the possibility that a rogue Canadian court might
consider the ordinance's actual effect, Canadian courts have not
developed a standard method for testing provincial legislation that
affects interprovincial commerce. This causes two problems: (1)
without stringent legislative restraints, provinces could become
economic islands unto themselves, as evidenced by recent events
surrounding Quebec; and (2) such economic isolation frustrates
the Canadian Constitutional framers' intent to obviate provincial
isolation. This Comment proposes as a solution that Canadian
courts adopt the U.S. courts' dormant commerce clause analysis.
The framers of the U.S. Constitution and Canada's Constitu-
tion (the British North America Act) drafted their respective
documents with different goals. The U.S. framers, their new na-
tion having recently shirked the Crown, sought to preserve indi-
vidual state power.2 The Canadians, drafting their Constitution
eighty years later in 1864-65, sought to avoid the "paroxysm of
state's rights" then plaguing the U.S. To that end, they deliber-
ately centralized their federal government. 3
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution empowers
Congress to create federal legislation relating to interstate com-
merce. When a state legislates in an area reserved by the Com-
merce Clause for the federal government, courts will sustain the
state's action if it does not violate the dormant commerce clause,
an implied restraint on state power.4 States may also exercise the
residual power of the Tenth Amendment, which immunizes states
2. See GEORGE BROWN TINDALL & DAVID E. SHI, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE
HISTORY 303,313 (4th ed. 1996).
3. See William C. Hodge, Patriation of the Canadian Constitution Comparative Fed-
eralism in a New Context, 60 WASH. L. REV. 585, 601 (1985); see also WILLIAM H.
MCCONNELL, COMMENTARY ON THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT 137 (1977).
4. If a state legislation conflicts with already existing federal legislation in the same
area, this discussion is moot. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2. In that situation, courts wield
the Supremacy Clause to invalidate state legislation, making any dormant commerce
clause jurisprudence unnecessary. Id.
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from federal regulation of state activity.
5
By contrast, the Canadian Constitution prohibits provinces
from legislating in the federal arena, even when the federal gov-
ernment has not acted.6 When provinces legislate, they must do so
within a specifically enumerated provincial power.7 Moreover,
any power not specifically assigned to provinces by default belongs
to the federal government under its "general" or "Residuary"
power.8
The U.S. Constitution has always allowed concurrent com-
merce power.9 U.S. jurisprudence, therefore, contains a well-
developed mechanism to determine the constitutionality of state
legislation that regulates interstate commerce. Courts apply a five-
part analysis that considers: (1) whether the state had a legitimate
purpose in enacting the regulation; (2) whether the means of the
legislation are rationally related to its purpose; (3) whether the
burden on interstate commerce substantially outweighs the bene-
fits; (4) whether the legislation discriminates, either on its face or
as applied; and (5) whether the legislation necessarily and inevita-
bly causes extraterritorial effects. 10
5. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166, 178-79 (1992) (invalidating part
of a federal plan for radioactive waste disposal because it compelled the state either to
manage waste according to the federal government's method, or take title to the waste
and incur all liability for environmental effects).
Congress may, however, regulate the states in efforts to ensure all citizens the
right to vote and to enforce 14th amendment rights. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2,
amend. XIV, § 5, amend. XV, § 2, amend. XIX, § 2, art. XXIV, § 2.
6. See Union Colliery Co. v. Bryden [18991 A.C. 580, 588; see also ALBERT S. ABEL,
LASKIN'S CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (4th ed. 1973).
7. See MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 137; see also British North America Act, 1867,
§ 92. The Constitution Act of 1982 did add concurrent provincial powers to export natural
resources to other provinces, the exercise of which is superseded by conflicting federal
legislation. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), § 92A. Section 92A seems to in-
sert a quasi-U.S. dormant commerce clause safeguard because it prohibits provincial ex-
port laws from "authoriz[ing] or [discriminating] in prices or in supplies exported to an-
other part of Canada." See also id § 92A(2). Section 92A(2), however, does not address
a main concern of U.S. dormant commerce clause jurisprudence: prohibiting states from
discriminating against out-of-state businesses wishing to sell or provide services within the
state. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951). Section 92A(2) solely
protects businesses and provinces from discrimination in pricing and supply when buying
natural provincial resources.
& See CAN. CONST. (British North America Act, 1867), § 91. This clause is known
as the "Peace, Order and Good Government" clause.
9. See generally U.S. CONST. The U.S. Constitution enumerates federal power in
article I, section 8 but does not similarly limiting state jurisdiction to specifically enumer-
ated areas.
10. The prongs combine the factors the U.S. Supreme Court has used to evaluate
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The British North America Act of 1867 did not allow concur-
rent power.1 When determining whether provincial legislation
was intra vires the Constitution, courts asked whether the province
had acted in an area delegated to the federal government (which
included trade and commerce). 12 In 1982, the Canadian legislature
overhauled the British North America Act of 1867, establishing
the current Canadian Constitution, known as the Constitution Act
of 1982.13 The Constitution Act of 1982 gives the provinces con-
current power to regulate the export of natural resources between
Canadian provinces, as long as provincial legislation does not
conflict with existing federal legislation.14
Unlike U.S. courts, Canadian courts have not devised a safe-
guard to limit provincial exercise of this concurrent power. Cana-
dian common law, however, does recognize three sources of legis-
lative control that can eradicate offensive provincial legislation:
the aforementioned Residuary Power, the Emergency Power, 15
state regulation of interstate commerce. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter.,
486 U.S. 888, 891 (1988); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Brown-Forman Dis-
tillers Corp. v. Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582-83 (1986); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S.
941, 955-56 (1982); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1981);
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
623-24 (1978); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524, 529 (1959); Dean
Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 356; Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 779-80 (1945);
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938); Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935); Bradley v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 289 U.S.
92, 95 (1933); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925).
11. This statement is qualified by the British North America Act's implied grant of
concurrent power, as interpreted by Canadian courts. Provincial governments may in-
fringe on textually exclusive federal power when the "pith and substance" of the provin-
cial act concerns exclusive provincial power. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF CANADA 314 (3d ed. Supp. 1992)[hereinafter HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
For further discussion see infra Part III.B.
12. Courts will occasionally answer this question by determining whether the prov-
ince has acted "extra-provincially." Burns Food Ltd. v. Att'y Gen. for Manitoba [1973]
S.C.R. 494, 502-04 (Can.) (stating "the direct regulation of interprovincial trade is of itself
a matter outside the legislative authority of any Province and it cannot be treated as an
accessory of local trade"); Attorney Gen. for Manitoba v. Manitoba Egg & Poultry Ass'n
[1971] 19 D.L.R. 3d 169, 177, 179 (The Egg Case) ("The issue which has to be considered
in this appeal is as to whether the [provincial act] is ultra vires the [provincial legislature]
because it trespasses upon the exclusive legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada
to legislate on the matter of the regulation of trade and commerce conferred by s. 91(2) of
the B.N.A. Act, 1867") (emphasis in original); John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton [1914] 18
D.L.R. 353,357,363.
13. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), § 60.
14. Section 92A represents the only change to the distribution of legislative powers
promulgated in 1982. See PETER W. HOGG, CANADA AcT 1982 ANNOTATED 102 (1982)
[hereinafter HOGG, ANNOTATED].
15. The Emergency Power permits the federal government, in cases of "emergency,"
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and the National Dimensions Test. 16 The federal government may
summon any of these powers in conjunction with the paramountcy
clause (akin to the U.S. Supremacy Clause). 17 Governmental ac-
tion, however, is time-consuming and financially burdensome.
Before 1982, provinces rarely regulated inter-provincial
commerce (in the absence of federal legislation) in a way that
overburdened extraprovincial participants. Courts could easily
dismiss offensive action by holding that trade and commerce were
within the exclusive ambit of federal power.18 Nevertheless, the
1982 amendments to the Constitution, particularly the addition of
section 92A, now allow provinces to act in the realm of trade and
commerce. 19 Because this was never previously an issue, Canadian
courts are ill-prepared to test the constitutionality of such actions.
At least one commentator has suggested this bodes poorly for the
future of free interprovincial trade and commerce:
There has been no development in Canada of [any doctrine
similar to the U.S. dormant commerce clause jurisprudence]...
or other comparable doctrine to limit provincial regulatory
authority over the sale or distribution or processing of goods
within the Province although brought in from . . . another
Province. Indeed, there is no reason presently to doubt the
power of a Province to establish at least a public monopoly in
certain goods or services, or otherwise to exclude competition
to assume jurisdiction over an area normally specifically reserved for provincial control
under section 92. JAMES MACPHERSON, DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 43,
44-48 (James MacPherson ed., 1978).
16. The federal government may legislate in a section 92 area if the subject matter is
of broad national concern. See id. at 43, 48-52.
17. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), § 52. The British North America Act
of 1867 enjoyed implicitly supreme status because "it was an imperial statute extending to
Canada," but lacked an explicit supremacy clause. HOGG, ANNOTATED, supra note 14, at
105. The U.S. Supremacy Clause mandates that in the case of a direct and obvious con-
flict between federal and state legislation, the federal law preempts state law.
18. See MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 142. "Once the possibilities of s. 92 were ex-
hausted, further enquiry was needless, since any jurisdiction not given to the provinces
would be embraced automatically in the residue known as the 'peace, order and good
government' clause." Id
Three other areas of concurrent Canadian legislative power exist: section 94A
(added in 1951) confers concurrent power to make laws in relation to old age pensions;
section 95 confers concurrent power over agriculture and immigration; and arguably sec-
tions 92(2) and 92A(4), in conjunction with section 91(3), create concurrent taxing power.
See HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 15-34.
This Comment focuses on the concurrent power over the interprovincial export of
natural resources. Provinces are more likely to abuse this power and consequently trans-
form themselves into economic islands.
19. See HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 102.
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in intra-provincial dealing.
20
Part II of this Comment describes the structure and distribu-
tion of both U.S. and Canadian legislative power, including the
Constitutional framers' intent as they drafted their respective con-
stitutions. Part III contrasts how U.S. courts have used the dor-
mant commerce clause to control state legislation. Part III further
demonstrates how the Canadian courts have declared provincial
legislation ultra vires the Constitution, and how the Canadian gov-
ernment may also act to invalidate provincial acts. Part IV recom-
mends that, to avoid provincial monopolies, Canadian courts adopt
an analysis similar to the one adopted by U.S. courts. Placing such
a restraint on provincial sovereignty maintains the intent of the
original framers. The drafters of the Constitution Act of 1982
surely agreed with this intent, because they merely amended, and
did not replace, the British North America Act.
II. THE STRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
A. The United States: Fear of Tyranny v. Fear Of The "Spirit Of
Locality"
The U.S. broke away from Great Britain in 178321 and fo-
cused on the task of forming a distinctly American method of gov-
ernment.22 In 1781, the states had adopted the toothless Articles
of the Confederation. At that time, the states were in "no mood
for a strong central government" and had not even granted Con-
gress the power to regulate interstate commerce. 23
Revolutionary leaders such as James Madison, however, were
concerned that the state legislatures' "spirit of locality" was
wreaking havoc on the "aggregate interests of the community. ' 24
At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, most delegates agreed
that the country would prosper under a strong central govern-
ment.25 To restrain federal authorities from abusing this power,
however, the framers gave the states broad sovereignty. 26
20. ALBERT S. ABEL, LASKIN'S CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 251 (4th ed.
1973).
21. See TINDALL & SHI, supra note 2, at 263.
22. See id. at 265.
23. See id. at 268.
24. See id. at 299.
25. See id. at 303.
26. See id.
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The U.S. Constitution enumerates seventeen federal powers
and grants Congress the power to "make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper" to execute these powers.27 The Constitu-
tion does not specifically list the states' powers. Instead, the Tenth
Amendment reserves to the states all powers not apportioned to
the federal government.28 Moreover, as discussed below, the
power to regulate interstate commerce exists concurrently with the
state power in the absence of conflicting federal legislation.
29
The framers, therefore, had addressed their concerns that a
"more perfect union" required a stronger central government.
They had achieved this goal while still granting the states ample
discretion. This discretion, however, did not come without a price.
In December 1860, the Southern states began signing the Ordi-
nances of Secession. This marked the start of the Civil War.
30
B. Canadian Centralism
The Canadians drafted their constitution in 1864, at a time
when their southern neighbors were experiencing a "paroxysm of
state's rights."' 31 Hoping to avoid these tensions,32 the Canadians
centralized their government.33
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-18.
2& See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
29. See TINDALL & SHI, supra note 2, at 414-15. The Gibbons v. Ogden opinion
"stopped just short of stating an exclusive federal power over commerce" and noted that
"later cases would clarify the point that states had a concurrent jurisdiction so long as it
did not come into conflict with federal action." lId
30. See id. at 685-86.
31. See Hodge, supra note 3, at 601.
32. See MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 137. Many delegates to the Canadian Consti-
tutional Convention opined that the American Civil War was simply an exacerbation of
"states' rights":
[M]any of the delegates considered that the insidious "states' rights" doctrine
that the central government was a mere delegate of the thirteen states, who re-
tained jurisdiction over all matter not given to Washington, was one source of
the conflict. It provided an intellectual basis for the exaggerated claims to "state
sovereignty" made by states like South Carolina.
Id.
33. See Hodge, supra note 3, at 602. John A. MacDonald, a Conservative leader, said
during the constitutional debates:
The primary error at the formation of [the U.S.] constitution was that each state
reserved to itself all sovereign rights, save the small portion delegated. [Canada]
must reverse this process by strengthening the General Government and con-
ferring on the Provincial bodies only such powers as may be required for local
purposes.
G. BROWN, DOCUMENTS ON THE CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA 94
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The British North America Act of 1867 grants exclusive fed-
eral control over twenty-nine areas (section 91 powers) 34 and ex-
clusive provincial control over sixteen areas (section 92 powers). 35
Generally, matters that are local or private in nature fall within the
ambit of provincial governance, 36 although these "matters" are
strictly limited to those enumerated in sections 92 and 92A of the
Constitution Act of 1982. In contrast, Section 91, is construed as
merely providing examples of areas over which the federal gov-
ernment has power. If one cannot locate a source of provincial
power in section 92, then the "peace, order and good government"
clause of section 91 assigns that power automatically to the federal
government. 37
This clause counters the de-centralizing influence of the Tenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and reserves all residual
power to the federal government. 38
A recent application of the "peace, order and good govern-
ment" clause occurs in Jones v. Attorney-General,39 in which the
Canadian Supreme Court sustained federal legislation authorizing
the use of Canada's two official languages. The Act's subject mat-
ter could not be found anywhere within section 92, and therefore it
fell somewhere within the federal residuary power.
The residuary power stemming from the "peace, order and
good government" clause of section 91 is limited by a parallel
grant of provincial residuary power.40 The "peace, order and good
government" clause is qualified by the next phrase in section 91,
"in relation to all [m]atters not coming within the [c]lasses of
[s]ubjects .. . assigned exclusively to the [l]egislatures of the
[p]rovinces. ' '41 This qualification, in conjunction with section
(1969).
34. See CAN. CONST. (British North America Act, 1867), § 91.
35. See id. § 92; see also id § 93 (granting provincial control over education, making a
total of 17 provincial powers).
36. See id. § 92, cl. 16.
37. See MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 142.
38. Moreover, section 90 of the British North America Act of 1867 further centralizes
control. See infra Part III.B. Section 90 enables federal government officers to invalidate
provincial statutes without restriction. See CAN. CONST. (British North America Act,
1867), § 90. The framers of the United States Constitution provided nothing similar. See
MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 132. U.S. courts, however, have taken on the task of in-
validating state statutes. See cases cited supra note 10.
39. [1975] 2 S.C.R. 182,189 (Can.).
40. See Hodge, supra note 3, at 607.
41. See CAN. CONST. (British North America Act, 1867), § 91.
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92(16),42 allows the reserve power to "seep" from the federal
branch to the provinces when the unenumerated power is local in
nature.43
The provincial residuary power is more akin to a slight of
hand than a true grant of power. While some matters are local in
nature and should belong exclusively to the provinces, the provin-
cial powers are, more accurately, concurrent. This is due to the
Emergency Power and the National Dimensions Test.44 Like the
residuary power, these sources of federal power stem from an in-
terpretation of the "peace, order and good government" clause.45
In times of crisis, the Emergency Power allows the federal
government to legislate in relation to subject matters normally
covered by section 92. 46 The courts have greatly expanded the
scope of this power over the years and the power reached its zenith
in the Anti-Inflation Reference case.47
In Anti-Inflation Reference, the court upheld federal wage and
price controls in the provinces. 48 Pursuant to that case, courts are
guided by seven factors when considering federal exercise of the
Emergency Power. These seven factors are:
1. It is unnecessary for Parliament to declare a state of na-
tional emergency for a situation to become an "emergency" within
the power.
2. It is irrelevant that the federal legislation incompletely
remedies the emergency. For example, in the Anti-Inflation Refer-
ence case, the Anti-Inflation Act only applied to forty-two percent
of the workers in the country.
3. The federal legislation need not be short-lived. For in-
stance, the Anti-Inflation Act had a potential life of thirty-eight
months.
4. A state of apprehended emergency suffices to justify Par-
liament in taking preventative measures. 49
42. Section 92(16) authorizes provincial power over all local matters. See iL §
92(16).
43. See Hodge, supra note 3, at 607.
44. See generally MACPHERSON, supra note 15.
45. See idL at 43.
46. See id. at 43, 43-48.
47. See Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act [1976] 68 D.L.R. 3d 452,454 (Can.).
48. See id
49. See MACPHERSON, supra note 15, at 47 (noting that all nine justices joined in this
holding).
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5. Emergency power is not limited to wartime situations.
50
6. The federal government may summon the Emergency
Power when confronted with national economic problems.51
7. Courts accord rational basis review to Emergency Power
legislation. 5
2
The second avenue the federal government may explore when
seeking to act in a seemingly local way is through the use of the
National Dimensions Test. The verbal formulation for the test is
as follows:
[I]f [the legislation] is such that it goes beyond local or pro-
vincial concern or interests and must from its inherent nature be
the concern of the Dominion as a whole.., then it will fall within
the competence of the Dominion Parliament as a matter affecting
the peace, order and good government of Canada, although it may
in another aspect touch on matters specially reserved to the pro-
vincial legislatures.53
These two tests are almost reverse dormant commerce clause
analyses, i.e., they test federal action that impinges on provincial
authority just as the dormant commerce clause tests state action
that impinges on federal jurisdiction. In each case, the federal ac-
tion survives if there is a conflict.54 Therefore, a Canadian federal
statute that deals with local topics will be ultra vires the constitu-
tion only if it fails the Emergency Power test or National Dimen-
sions Test.55
No such similar process exists for provincial action that in-
trudes into the federal dimension. The reason is simple. Accord-
ing to the text of the Canadian Constitution, provinces may only
act according to the powers explicitly listed for them in section
92.56 Moreover, provinces may not exercise unused federal re-
siduary power to make laws for the peace, order and good gov-
50. See id (noting all nine justices agreed to this principle).
51. See id. at 48 (noting unanimous approval of this point).
52- See id.
53. See Canada Temperance case [1946] A.C. 193, 205; MACPHERSON, supra note 15,
at 48-49.
54. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (Supremacy Clause); CAN. CONST. (Constitution
Act, 1982), § 52(1) (Paramountcy Clause); see also HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra
note 11, at 105 (noting that the British North America Act of 1867 had an implicit para-
mountcy clause); see also MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 141.
55. See MACPHERSON, supra note 15, at 43.
56. See MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 142.
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ernment of Canada.57
Until recently, the powers enumerated in section 92 (which
had been essentially the same since the Constitution's inception in
1867) had a local flair.58 Therefore, no provincial act that had ex-
tra-provincial effects would stand, because it exceeded section
92.59 Because this exceeded section 92, no test was necessary to
determine whether it remained constitutional (i.e., in the sense
that the U.S. states can appropriately exercise a federal power).60
In 1982, however, the Canadian legislature called a constitu-
tional convention and overhauled the British North America Act.
The Constitution Act of 1982 made one change in the delegation
of legislative powers:61 provinces may now control the export of
natural resources between themselves and other Canadian prov-
inces-an area which previously came exclusively within the fed-
eral authority under section 92, clause 2 (the "trade and commerce
clause") or the residuary power.62
The provincial power to control the export of natural re-
sources lies in section 92A. Section 92A also checks this power by
proscribing discrimination when provinces determine the price and
supply of natural resources to other provinces. 63 The legislature
was concerned that this new autonomy would intoxicate the prov-
inces into isolating themselves.
Because provinces had never been allowed to wield federal
commerce power, Canadian courts had never had to evaluate pro-
vincial exercises of commerce power. By 1982, U.S. courts, how-
ever, had developed an intricate test for state legislation that
treaded on federal commerce power.
57. See ABEL, supra note 20, at 10-11.
58. See MCCONNNELL, supra note 3, at 142. There is always, of course, that sneaky
implied concurrent power, which arises when provinces legislate locally in "pith and sub-
stance" but impinges on federal jurisdiction. See HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra
note 14, at 314.
59. See id
60. See MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 142.
61. See HOGG, ANNOTATED, supra note 11, at 102.
62. See id (stating "[b]efore coming into force of the Constitution Act, 1982, laws in
relation to the export of natural resources were outside the power of the provincial Legis-
latures"); see also Cent. Canada Potash v. Gov. of Saskatchwan [1979] 1 S.C.R. 42.
63. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), § 92A(2) ("but such laws may not
authorize or provide for discrimination in prices supplies exported to another part of
Canada.").
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III. ENFORCING THE BOUNDARIES OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
A. Letting Sleeping Dogs Lie: To What Extent May the States Act
When the Federal Government Declines to Legislate?
The U.S. Constitution provides for concurrent commerce
power.64 States may act in' those areas of commerce where Con-
gress has been silent.65 Courts will invalidate a state exercise of
the commerce power, however, if it fails an inquiry into purpose
and means.66
The dormant commerce clause, a nontextual constraint on
state power, provides the source of this intricate investigation. The
doctrine reflects the perpetual tension between the federal and
state governments. The source of this tension lies in the question:
How much national influence may a state exert? 67 The U.S. Su-
preme Court has applied various tests for the past seventy years to
check state regulation of interstate commerce. Part III.A synthe-
sizes these tests into a five-prong analysis. 68
64. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have the power... [t]o
regulate Commerce among the several States").
65. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353-54 ("[S]ince Congress has not
spoken to the contrary, the subject matter of the ordinance lies within the sphere of state
regulation even though interstate commerce may be affected.").
This Comment does not analyze express Congressional grants of commerce
power to the states, by which Congress can authorize states to interfere with interstate
commerce. See White v. Mass. Council of Const. Employers, Inc, 460 U.S. 204, 213
(1983) (stating in dicta that "[w]here state or local government action is specifically
authorized by Congress, it is not subject to the Commerce Clause even if it interferes with
interstate commerce"); see also Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53
U.S. 299, 311-12, 320 (1851) (upholding Pennsylvania statute requiring vessels coming
into or leaving the Port of Pennsylvania to accept local pilots. Regulation of pilots is
within the federal commerce power, but here Congress had granted this power to the
states.).
This Note likewise does not contrast the Canadian counterpart with U.S. consti-
tutional grants of power to states. Canada's counterpart, "federal inter-delegation," al-
lows the federal government to delegate its power to the provinces. See BERNARD W.
FUNSTON & EUGENE MEEHAN, CANADA'S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 57
(1994).
66. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988) (stating "[i]t has
long been accepted that the Commerce Clause not only grants Congress the authority to
regulate commerce among the States, but also directly limits the power of the States to
discriminate against interstate commerce.").
67. See TINDALL & SHI, supra note 2, at 303.
68. I would like to thank Professor David Burcham of Loyola Law School, Los Ange-
les, California, for gathering the various factors of this test; no court has applied this test
in its entirety.
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1. Was the state pursuing a legitimate purpose in enacting the
statute?
Determining what constitutes a legitimate purpose requires a
case-by-case analysis. Safety measures, however, carry a strong
presumption of validity, as long as the state can prove the safety
purpose is nonillusory.
69
In Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission, the Court sustained
an Ohio requirement that common carriers traveling on the state's
highways use the least congested routes. 70 The Court noted that
the order did not preclude common carriers from participating in
interstate commerce; they simply had to apply for alternate
routes. 71
The Bradley court distinguished the case at bar from Buck v.
Kuykendall, in which it struck down a Washington statute that
similarly required common carriers using state highways to obtain
certificates of "convenience and necessity. ' 72 In Buck, the state
would not certify the plaintiff because the route he had applied for
was already being adequately served.73 The Court held the pri-
mary purpose of the regulation, however, was to prohibit competi-
tion; the state could use the statute to determine exactly who could
use the highways. 74
The Court compared the test for route-approval in Bradley,
which looked closely at congestion, to the test in Buck, which in-
quired into whether the route was currently being adequately
served.75 Therefore, the court held that the advancement of safety
in Buck had been merely incidental, whereas the statute in Bradley
specifically promoted safety.76
69. See Bradley v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92, 95 (1933).
70. See id at 94.
71. See id. at 94-95.
72. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-316 (1925); see also Bradley, 289 U.S. at
95.
73. See Buck, 267 U.S. at 313.
74. See id at 316.
75. See Bradley, 289 U.S. at 95.
76. See id at 95-96. Note that even if the Court finds a legitimate purpose, such as
safety, it will invalidate a statute as per se unconstitutional if the statute's means employ
economic protectionism. Thus, in Baldwin, the Court struck a statute that sought to main-
tain a plentiful milk supply by requiring purchasers of out-of-state milk to pay no less than
the minimum in-state milk prices. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 519,
521 (1935). The Court held that the state must use other means to accomplish its purpose
because the statute's means shielded in-state farmers from competition with out-of-state
farmers. Id at 528.
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2. Are the state legislature's means rationally related to its ends?
The court here defers to the state legislature and does not
explore whether more functional alternatives exist.77 In Barnwell
Brothers, for example, the Court sustained a statute that restricted
imposed widths on trucks for safety reasons. The Court said its job
did not include weighing the "merits of legislative choice and re-
ject[] it if the weight of evidence presented in court appears to fa-
vor a different standard. '78
3. Does the statute's burden on interstate commerce substantially
outweigh the benefits?
79
Contrary to the issue of whether the means are rationally re-
lated to the purpose, this "balancing test," which weighs the bur-
dens a statute places on interstate commerce against its benefits,
receives much stricter scrutiny. 80
In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., Illinois required truckers
to use a certain type of mudflap when traveling on the state's
highways.81 The Court looked at the practical effect of this regu-
lation on other states and determined that the cost clearly out-
77. See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190
(1938).
78. I& at 191.
79. Since Kassel, the Court has declined to apply this balancing test to "true safety"
cases, reasoning that in the field of safety, state lawmakers deserve deference. See Kassel
v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 681 n.1 & 691 (1980) (Brennan, J. and Mar-
shall, J. concurring and Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J. and Stewart, J. dissenting, combined to
make five justices against applying this prong in true safety cases.).
80. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781-82 (1945). The court de-
termined a statute limiting the number of cars per freight and passenger train had used
means rationally related to safety. The Court struck the statute, however, because of the
substantial cost railroad companies would incur changing the length of their cars at the
state's border, and the availability of more efficient alternatives. See id.
Justice Scalia, concurring in Bendix Autolite Corporation, discussed infra, felt this
balancing test should be left to the legislature. If Congress felt the burden of a state's
legislation outweighed its benefit, it could enact a statute in direct conflict. Then, by vir-
tue of the Supremacy Clause, it could void the state's statute. Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enter., 486 U.S. 888, 897-98 (1988)(Scalia, J., concurring).
In Bendix, the Ohio statute of limitations for breach of contract was tolled when a
defendant corporation was not present in the state. See iii at 888. The only way to be-
come "present" in the state was to consent to general jurisdiction. See id The court held
this clearly burdened out-of-state corporations because they either had to submit to gen-
eral jurisdiction or refrain from pleading a statute of limitations defense. See id at 895.
Conversely, there was slim benefit because plaintiffs could simply use long-arm statutes to
reach out-of-state defendants. See id at 894.
81. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520,522-23 (1959).
206
1997] Awakening Canada's Dormant Commerce Clause 207
weighed any debatable contribution to safety. 82 If the regulation
stood, truckers would have to change equipment at the border to
meet the states' different standards, and "carriers who [did] only a
minor amount of their business in Illinois [would be required] to
equip all their trailers with the... mudguards.
''83
If the Court cannot declare that the burdens clearly outweigh
the benefits of a state statute, it inquires whether the state is em-
ploying the least burdensome, but equally effective, alternative. 84
In Maine v. Taylor, Maine prohibited baitfish retailers from im-
porting baitfish.85 The purpose was to prevent parasites prevalent
in out-of-state baitfish from infecting the in-state baitfish popula-
tion.8 6 The Court held the plaintiff's conviction under the statute
was proper. Although the plaintiff proposed an inspection and
sampling method as an alternative, it would not have been as ef-
fective as the complete ban on importation.87
4. Does the state legislation discriminate against non-state
residents?
The Court asks whether the legislation discriminates either
facially or as applied. The Court uses strict scrutiny to protect out-
of-state plaintiffs who may be excluded from the state's political
process. 88
In Dean Milk v. City of Madison, milk-sellers could only sell
milk that was pasteurized within five miles of Madison City.89 The
statute did not, on its face, discriminate against pasteurizers on the
basis of state residency. Discrimination was, however, its effect.90
If the state legislation does discriminate, the Court asks
whether less discriminatory alternatives exist that are equally as
effective: (1) whether the state has exhausted all other nondis-
criminatory measures; and (2) whether the state distributed the
burden among in-state and out-of-state residents.
82. See id. at 530.
83. See id at 528.
84. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131,138 (1986).
85. See id at 132
86. See id at 133.
87. See id at 147. This case prompted Justice Blackmun to bemoan, "Once again, a
little fish has caused a commotion." See id at 132.
8& See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2
(1938).
89. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349,350 (1950).
90. See id at 356.
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With respect to the first criterion, the Court in Philadelphia v.
New Jersey determined that the statute in that case effected eco-
nomic protectionism because supposedly to conserve space only
in-state companies could dump at landfill sites.91 Nonetheless, the
Court could have struck the ordinance on the ground that New
Jersey had not considered other conservation methods.
In Sporhase v. Nebraska, the Court ruled on the second part
of the discrimination test. The Court held a state permit require-
ment for exporters of water was constitutional because the re-
quirement applied evenhandedly to both residents and nonresi-
dents.92 By contrast, the Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma struck an
Oklahoma statute that purported to conserve minnows by forbid-
ding their export out of the state. 93 The Court noted that, "[t]he
state places no limits on... how these minnows may be disposed
of within the state." 94
5. Does the state measure have extraterritorial effects?
The Court will hold any legislation with extraterritorial effects
per se unconstitutional. The Court invalidates only those laws
which necessarily and inevitably have extraterritorial effects. 95
"Necessarily and inevitably" does not mean simply that the
law caused a plaintiff to change his out-of-state behavior for cost
efficiency reasons.96 Rather, the law must result in the plaintiff
having no choice but to change some aspect of his out-of-state be-
havior.
In Brown-Forman, for example, New York required out-of-
state distributors to affirm that the prices they charged New York
buyers were no higher than the lowest price they charged in other
states.97 This prevented out-of-state liquor sellers from subse-
quently lowering the prices they charged in other states, because to
do so would put them at odds with their New York buyers.98
The U.S. Constitution has presented federal courts with many
91. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
92. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 941 (1982).
93. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,322 (1979).
94. Id. at 338.
95. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 581-82 (1986).
96. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-72 (1945). Southern
Pacific limited the length of all the trains in its line, not just the trains that entered Ari-
zona, because it would not be cost efficient to build a separate line. See id&
97. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579-80.
98. See i&.
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opportunities to judge state action, and courts have interpreted it
to afford concurrent jurisdiction over interstate commerce.
Through these opportunities, U.S. courts have honed their analy-
ses and created the above five-prong test.
The Canadian courts, however, have not created a similar test.
The Canadian Constitution has presented Canadian courts with
concurrent jurisdiction for a relatively short fourteen years.
Moreover, Canadian courts have hesitated to address even cases of
provincial legislation that impinge on exclusive federal power be-
cause the area is unclear and untested. Canadian courts, therefore,
have not yet finely tuned their federal-provincial separation of
powers mechanism.
B. From Eggs and Hogs to Trees and Electricity: How Canadian
Courts Ensure the Free Flow of Commerce and Why They are Ill-
Equipped to Handle Section 92A's Fall-Out
Canadian courts must be loathe to confront provincial legisla-
tion enacted pursuant to section 92A of the Constitution Act of
1982. Section 92A bestows concurrent provincial jurisdiction with
the federal government over the export of natural resources, in-
cluding nonrenewable resources, forestry resources, and electrical
energy.
Canadian courts previously inquired into whether provincial
legislation stepped beyond the boundaries of an exclusive enu-
meration of provincial powers. 99 Now, they venture through the
murky realm of interprovincial discrimination. The test for
whether a province properly exports a natural resource is whether
it "discriminat[es] in prices or in supplies exported to another part
of Canada."1 00
Because for fourteen years Canadian courts only had to de-
termine whether provinces have abused this concurrent grant of
power, they have not developed a test as thorough or effective as
the U.S. dormant commerce clause analysis. Though section 92A
proscribes discrimination in supplying and pricing, and thus, re-
duces discrimination to a certain extent, it fails to prevent prov-
inces from actually or effectively blocking the flow of commerce
into their territory.
The framers of both the U.S. Constitution and British North
99. See CAN. CONST. (British North America Act, 1867), § 92.
100. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), § 92A(2).
209
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
America Act of 1867 shared a common desire to facilitate "the
free flow of commerce across local borders, and also to prevent
discrimination by local units against goods coming in from outside,
which could thereby impose a fetter on interstate or interprovin-
cial commerce." 10 1 The two sets of framers, however, structured
their governments in diametric opposition to one another.
Describing how the British North America act distributed
legislative power, Canadian Supreme Court Justice Fournier said:
[T]he Canadian trade and commerce power should be stronger
than its American counterpart .... [W]hile in the United States
the power to regulate "interior and exterior" commerce was di-
vided between the states and the central power, and conse-
quently had to be shared, in Canada the power to regulate trade
and commerce belonged exclusively to the Dominion.. 102
Historically, Canadian courts had an easy task when testing pro-
vincial exercises of power because section 91 delegated exclusive
powers to the federal government. The courts simply inquired
whether the province had acted in an exclusive section 91 area. If
so, the court invalidated the action.
For example, in the Egg Case, the province had imposed lim-
its on egg marketing.103 The province expressly sought to maintain
domestic egg prices.1°4 The Supreme Court struck the egg market-
ing control, not because it discriminated against out-of-province
eggs, which it did, but simply because it had invaded the federal
trade and commerce power.105
Similarly, in Burns Food Limited v. Attorney General for
Manitoba, the Supreme Court struck provincial legislation requir-
ing hog processors to purchase hogs at a provincially constituted
board.10 6 The opinion hinged on the idea that the province was
regulating extraprovincial contracts, e.g., trade and commerce, and
that it was simply an added evil that this fettered interprovincial
commerce. 107
101. See MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 169.
102. Id at 171; see also Severn v. The Queen [1878] 2 S.C.R. 70, 121 (Can.)
(interpreting the British North America Act and citing, for comparison, Gibbons v. Og-
den, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824)).
103. See The Egg Case [1971] 19 D.L.R. 3d 169, 173.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 179.
106. See Burns Food Ltd. v. Att'y Gen. for Manitoba [1973] S.C.R. 494, 505-06.
107. See id.
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Three glitches remain, however, in this seemingly compre-
hensive system: (1) it is unclear whether the legislative, executive,
or judicial branch is responsible for striking provincial legislation
that is ultra vires the Constitution;108 (2) because they are unsure
of their role, Canadian courts have traditionally been hesitant to
find provincial legislation intrudes into the exclusive domain of
section 91, i.e., federal control; and (3) when courts do find some-
thing is within the exclusive control of the province, which they are
apt to do, they typically afford the province carte blanche to dis-
criminate against other provinces and to protect themselves
against competition. These problems with the "exclusive-power-
jurisprudence," explained more fully below, exist in full force to-
day. This is because the Constitution Act of 1982 still assigns pre-
dominantly exclusive power.109
Three theories exist regarding who checks Canadian provin-
cial legislation. The first theory, stated in John Deere Plow Com-
pany v. Wharton, provides that the provinces must not intrude on
"federal heads" and that any intrusion would be remedied by the
federal legislature superseding the provincial legislation. 110
Twenty-four years later, the Supreme Court gave effect to the
second theory, by reaffirming the federal "power of disallowance"
of provincial legislation.111 In Reference Re Power of Disallow-
ance and Power of Reservation, the Court discusses section 90 of
the British North America Act,112 which delegates this power of
108. See FUNSTON & MEEHAN, supra note 65, at 57.
109. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), §§ 91, 92 (listing the exclusive federal
and provincial powers, respectively); see also, supra Part II.B.
110. See John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton [1914] 18 D.L.R. 353 (suggesting regulating
the sale of guns has local, section 92 aspects, but more appropriately falls under section 91
federal power); see also MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 135 ("However outrageous and
unjust a law may be, if it presents no clear conflict with existing federal policy or interest.
the cure for it lies with the provincial electorate.").
Note that this is different from the situation discussed in Part II.B, in which the
federal government eradicates offensive provincial legislation (using the residuary power,
the emergency power, or national dimensions test.). See MACPHERSON, supra note 15, at
44-52. In that situation, the provincial legislation is properly within its section 92 powers,
but considered so harmful that the federal government steps in and preempts the legisla-
tion. Id.
111. Reference Re Power of Disallowance and Power of Reservation [1938] 9 S.C.R.
71, 72 (Can.).
112. The British North America Act of 1867 was in effect until 1982, when the legisla-
ture enacted the Constitution Act of 1982. See HOGG, ANNOTATED, supra note 11, at
142. Section 90 remained unchanged. See CAN. CONST (Constitution Act, 1982), § 90.
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disallowance to the Governor General in Council. 113 The power
of disallowance is an executive power that is subject to "no limita-
tions or restrictions," except that it must be exercised within one
year of the Governor-General's receipt of the legislation.
114
No instances of disallowance have occurred since Canada en-
acted its Constitution Act in 1982.115 Nevertheless, "[t]he possibil-
ity is still not foreclosed that in the case of provincial legislation
which clearly challenges important federal policies or interests the
federal disallowance power might once more be invoked."'
1 16
The final theory is that unless a provincial statute conflicts
with a federal statute, an individual or entity may only challenge
the provincial statute in court.117 Courts that exercise this power
determine whether a province has intruded into a federal sphere of
power. This theory treats the legislative and "power of disallow-
ance" theories as mere operations of the paramountcy clause. It
gives courts the more formidable task of determining when a
province has acted impermissibly but its action does not conflict
with federal legislation.
This leads to the second problem with Canadian exclusive-
power-jurisprudence: Canadian courts hesitate to find provinces
have legislated to control subjects, individuals, or entities outside
their local control. Theoretically, this is because courts do not
want to be chastised for having stepped outside their bounda-
ries.11 8
For example, in Re Conklin Garrett Ltd. and Director of Ele-
vating Devices, Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Rela-
tions,119 the Supreme Court sustained the Ontario Amusement
Devices Act's authority over the appellant. 120
113. See CAN. CONST. (British North America Act, 1867), § 90 (also delegating this
power of reservation to a provincial lieutenant-governor, acting as a federal executive of-
ficer); Reference Re Power [1938] 9 S.C.R. at 74.
114. Reference Re Power [1938] 9 S.C.R. at 79.
115. The federal government has not exercised the power of disallowance since 1943.
See MCCONNELL, supra note 3, at 133, 135.
116. See id at 136.
117. See id. at 135.
11& See id. at 136 (noting that the Canadian political climate has always tended to-
wards co-operative federalism, in direct contravention of the Constitutional framers' in-
tent, and that political leaders therefore give broad leeway to provincial governments).
119. See Re Conklin & Garrett Ltd. and Director of Elevating Devices, Ministry of
Consumer and Commercial Relations [1989] 63 D.L.R. 4th 545 (Can.).
120. See id at 546.
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The Amusement Devices Act required that "no amusement
device [could] be operated in Ontario without a permit and that
technical dossiers showing compliance with detailed requirements
of the [Act] ... be filed with Ontario officials ... before a permit
[would] be issued for that device. ' 121 Appellant owned and oper-
ated amusement park rides, which it trucked interprovincially to
various fairs and exhibitions. 122 Appellant claimed the Amuse-
ment Devices Act intruded upon interprovincial trade and com-
merce. 123
The court acknowledged that the Act undeniably intruded on
federal authority and that it regulated "in great detail" the opera-
tions to which it applied. 124 The court, however, held that the Act
did not impinge on the exclusive federal power to regulate inter-
provincial trade and commerce because it was aimed at activities
taking place within Ontario's borders:
The [appellant] operates its rides in one place at a time. On-
tario purports to regulate only the operations in Ontario. Neither
the Act nor the Regulations [imposed pursuant to the Act] was
applied to the Ontario operations of the applicant are in our
opinion beyond the constitutional powers of the Province of On-
tario.125
Arguably, the court would have approached this case differ-
ently if it had not been concerned with its power to declare pro-
vincial legislation invalid. The court might have held appellant's
business was inherently interprovincial in nature, and appellant
would have been subject only to the exclusive legislative power of
the federal government. 126 Instead, the court avoided the thorny
problems of federalism and circumvented it to achieve a more
121. Id (operators of these devices also had to be licensed).
122. See id. at 547.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id at 549. The court further held that the appellant could not avail itself of sec-
tion 92(10)(a) of the British North America Act of 1867, which gives provinces control
over all local works and undertakings, with the exception of, among other things, "[w]orks
and [u]ndertakings... connecting the Province with any other or others of the Provinces,
or extending beyond the Limits of the Province." Id at 548.
The court limited section 92(10)(a) to transportation or communications under-
takings, and held it therefore did not apply to the appellant because, "[t]he communica-
tions elements of the [appellant's] undertakings are local and the transportation elements
do not involve transporting people or freight across provincial ... boundaries for hire."
Id
126. See id.
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logical result. This was unfortunate, because the most effective
method of checking runaway provinces is a judicial declaration of
unconstitutionality.
The propensity of Canadian courts to find provincial legisla-
tion valid within the exclusive power of the provincial govern-
ments is the third problem with exclusive-power-jurisprudence.
As long as the province has proven it has exclusive power, courts
grant broad deference to provincial legislatures to exercise this ju-
risdiction. The extreme result has potentially become the night-
mare vision of the Canadian constitutional framers.
A good example is Bennett v. British Columbia (Securities
Commission).127 In Bennett, appellants traded shares of a corpo-
ration on the Toronto Stock Exchange through the exchange's
Computer Assisted Trading System (CATS), 128 a national com-
munication system. 129 The British Columbia Securities Commis-
sion instituted criminal proceedings against appellants when it sus-
pected that they were involved in insider trading. 130
Appellants challenged the Commission's action. 131 They ar-
gued that legislation regarding securities trading with CATS com-
pletely exceeded provincial jurisdiction, and thus, section 68 of the
Securities Act was inapposite. 132
The court employed the "pith and substance" test, which Ca-
nadian courts have occasionally used to characterize legislation.133
The court inquired "whether the pith and substance of the provin-
cial enactment is in relation to matters which fall within the field of
provincial legislative competence. 1 34 It held that section 68's pith
and substance concerned ethical trading conduct, and that it was
purely local and intraprovincial. 135 Therefore, British Columbia
had the power to enact section 68.136
127. See Bennett v. British Columbia (Securities Commission) [1992] 94 D.L.R. 4th
339 (Can.).
128. See id at 340.
129. See id.
130. The Commission alleged appellants had violated section 68 of the British Co-
lumbia Securities Act. See idt
131. See id.
132 See id
133. See HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 313; see also FUNSTON &
MEEHAN, supra note 65, at 124.
134. Bennett [19921 94 D.L.R. at 357.
135. Id.
136. Id
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As noted, section 68's pith and substance was local. There-
fore, it was valid even though it might have an extra-provincial ef-
fect and even though "the conduct which it authorize[d] or pro-
hibit[ed] [was] carried to fruition via the national ... system."'
1 37
These incidental or consequential effects on extra-provincial rights
were not ultra vires.138
More troubling is that while there is an "effects" test available
to Canadian courts, the courts use the test sparingly. 139 The
"effects" test checks provinces' wielding exclusive provincial
power to incidentally affect matters outside their jurisdiction. It
considers how statutes "change the rights and liabilities of those
who are subject to it." 140
The court in Reference Re Alberta Legislation applied the test
to strike a statute that Alberta characterized as a tax (strictly lo-
cal). 141 The court, using the effects test, called the "tax" a banking
statute because of its likely severe impact on banks.142
This test would have been an appropriate tool with which the
Bennett court could have struck section 68, or at least not have
applied it to the appellants. Curiously, however, the court did not
even mention the effects test.
The effects test is discretionary and many courts prefer not to
apply it. This is perhaps because they are uncomfortable with their
role in declaring provincial legislation ultra vires.143
In addition, the effects test has been watered down, leading
some scholars to speculate that if the effect is necessarily inciden-
tal to an otherwise constitutional law and the statute's purpose is
rationally related to its means, the courts will sustain the legisla-
tion. 144
Seemingly, a provincial legislature could enact a measure with
a purported local aim, and subsequently use it to regulate inter-
provincial trade and commerce at will. The framers of the British
137. Id
138. See Id
139. See FUNSTON & MEEHAN, supra note 65, at 124.
140. Id
141. See Reference Re Alberta Legislation, A.C. 117 (P.C. 1939).
142. See id
143. See FUNSTON & MEEHAN, supra note 65, at 52 ("marginal encroachment will
more likely be tolerated than one which is highly intrusive, but this will be determined on
the facts of each case"). See generally City National Leasing Ltd. v. General Motors of
Canada Ltd. [1989] S.C.R. 641 (Can.).
144. See FUNSTON & MEEHAN, supra note 65, at 52.
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North America Act of 1867, whose main goal was to safeguard the
strong central federal government, would be dismayed to see their
safeguards transmuted in such a way.
Similar problems are brewing in Canada's concurrent-power-
jurisprudence, because in Canada, exclusivity is the rule and con-
currency is the exception. 145 Scant case law exists regarding sec-
tion 92A, which confers concurrent powers over natural resources.
Most discussions regarding its scope are speculative. 146 Using the
available material, however, a trend emerges-courts seem not to
care whether provinces discriminate against interstate commerce.
Canadian courts resist finding that federal and provincial leg-
islation in concurrent areas conflict, perhaps because this would
then require them to strike the provincial legislation pursuant to
the paramountcy doctrine. 147 This has resulted in a major shift
towards giving effect to provincial power. Perhaps Quebec's re-
cent move towards independence and separation from Canada has
made the judiciary react by attempting to pacify other similar sen-
timents. 148 Whatever the motive, this deference to provincial
command signifies a clear revolt against Canada's carefully con-
structed central system of government. 149
The only time courts will strike a provincial statute is when it:
(1) encroaches on an exclusive federal power (see above discus-
sion); or (2) inhabits a concurrent seat that clearly and directly
conflicts with federal legislation.150 Scholars explain the courts'
timidity by noting that courts pay no attention to any other criteria
and will uphold provincial legislation that erects economic barriers
at provincial borders. 151 Another reason is that Canadian citizens
who engage in interprovincial trade and commerce do not bring
their suits into the court system.
145. See id. at 119 (noting that this is in contrast to the U.S., in which exclusivity is the
exception and almost all other powers are concurrent).
146. See Allard Contractors Ltd. v. Coquitlam [1991] 85 D.L.R. 4th 729, 735 (Can.). In
reference to section 92A, the court noted, "[c]ounsel were unable to refer us to any appel-
late judgment which has yet been delivered upon the meaning and operation of this sec-
tion." Id
147. See FUNSTON & MEEHAN, supra note 65, at 51.
148 See id at 24 (stating "while the establishment of the Canadian federation may
have been driven by external forces ... internal forces are now more likely to influence
the future of the country").
149. See id.
150. See id. at 52.
151. See id.
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Canadian courts will accord a presumption of validity to pro-
vincial legislation.152 They occasionally refer to the absence of
federal legislation in a certain area, and uphold provincial meas-
ures on the basis that the federal government failed to act.
153
In Fulton v. Energy Resources Conservation Board,154 for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court sustained the authority of the Alberta
Energy Resources Conservation Board.155 The court reasoned
that because no federal regulatory authority embraced the situa-
tion at hand, the unexercised federal authority gave "leeway to the
exercise of provincial authority."'
156
The court failed to search for improper motives or burdens on
interprovincial trade and commerce. The court simply noted that
should federal legislation enter the scene, the doctrine of para-
mountcy would invalidate the Board's authority. 157 The court
added, however, the caveat that the doctrine of paramountcy could
take effect only if a court construed the provincial legislation to
conflict with the federal legislation.158 A U.S. court, by contrast,
would have gone through a two-step process: (1) it would have de-
termined that Congress had not acted; and (2) it would have put
the legislation through the dormant commerce clause test.
The U.S. Constitution provides many instances of concurrent
jurisdiction. U.S. courts have adapted to analyzing state-level con-
currency. The Canadian Constitution, however, allows little con-
current jurisdiction. Canadian courts are understandably con-
founded when they must decide whether a province has acted intra
vires the Constitution in enacting, e.g., an ordinance regulating the
export of natural resources to and from its territory.
152. See HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 15-34 n.158.
153. See id.
154. See Fulton v. Energy Resources Conservation Bd. [1981] S.C.R. 153 (Can.).
155. Id. at 154.
156. See id. at 164-65 (stating "the field is open for valid provincial legislation of the
kind which the Board has acted in this case").
157. See idL at 169.
158. See iii
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IV. A CANADIAN DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE APPROACH:
RETURNING To THE CENTRALISM THE FRAMERS INTENDED
Fulton v. Energy Resources Conservation Board159 parallels
the U.S. case Buck v. Kuykendall.160 A comparison of these two
cases illustrates what Canadian courts might overlook when they
face provincial legislation in a concurrent area.
In Buck, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a state statute
that required common carriers using state highways to obtain cer-
tificates of "convenience and necessity." 161 The Court based its
decision on the state's illegitimate purpose for denying the plaintiff
a certificate. 162 The state claimed the route plaintiff had applied
for was already being adequately served. 163 The Court, however,
held the state's primary purpose was to prohibit competition; i.e.,
the state could determine exactly who used the highways and for
what purpose.164
The plaintiff in Fulton, a Calgary power company, was de-
nied approval to construct a transmission line connecting Al-
berta to British Columbia.165 The court mentioned that land-
owners in the area surrounding the proposed construction site
opposed the plaintiffs application. 166 The court, however, did
not consider Alberta's motive in creating the Energy Reserve
Conservation Board (the entity that had denied the plaintiffs
permit) and giving it the discretionary power to grant and deny
permits.
The court, therefore, never considered that Alberta had
possibly wanted to exclude "out-of-state" power companies
from the market, so as to make room for its own.167 U.S. courts
would have at least, reached this issue, rather than ending their
analysis as soon as they determined that the federal government
had not acted.168
159. See id at 153.
160. See Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
161. See ioL at 313, 317.
162. See ui
163. See id
164. See iii at 315.
165. See Fulton v. Energy Resources Conservation Bd. [1981] S.C.R. 153,157 (Can.).
166. See id at 160.
167. This motive would mirror the state's motive in Buck to prevent out-of-state
truckers from competing with in-state truckers. See Buck, 267 U.S. at 317.
168. For a discussion of the dormant commerce clause analysis, the method that U.S.
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The problem Canadian courts have when confronting pro-
vincial legislation lies not only in explicit concurrent powers,
but also in implicit grants of concurrent power. The pith and
substance test, for example, allows provinces to affect matters
coming exclusively within federal power, as long as the pith and
substance of the provincial legislation is a "matter within the
competence of the [province].
'16 9
Therefore, Canadian courts are actually surrounded by
hidden exercises of concurrent power.170 The Canadian Consti-
tution, after having been amended in 1982, still champions a
strong central government. 171 If Canadian courts are to remain
true to the basic structure of their Constitution, they must begin
limiting these provincial exercises of concurrent power.
The Fulton and Bennett cases illustrate the numerous safe-
guards in the U.S. dormant commerce clause analysis. As al-
ready mentioned, the Fulton court could have easily swept the
provincial legislation ultra vires the constitution under the first
prong of the dormant commerce clause analysis. Alberta was
not pursuing a legitimate purpose in enacting the Energy Re-
sources Conservation Board.
The Fulton court could have also, however, struck the
measure by employing prong three of the dormant commerce
clause analysis. Alberta's legislation discriminated against non-
provincial residents because the ordinance that created the
Board only considered interconnections with facilities in other
provinces. More than likely, as in the Fulton case, 172 the appli-
cants wishing to connect Albertan electrical lines with those in
other provinces will be nonresidents of Alberta.
Similarly, in Bennett, British Columbia enforced the British
Columbia Securities Act against the appellants who were trad-
ing shares of a corporation on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 173
This Act substantially burdened more than it benefited inter-
courts have tested state exercises of concurrent legislation. See supra Part III.A.
169. See HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 15-35.
170. See id at 15-37 (finding "there are many cases in which provincial laws, held to be
in relation to a matter coming within a provincial class of subject, have been held to have
a valid incidental effect on a matter within federal jurisdiction").
171. See generally CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) (retaining sections 91 and 92,
the two exclusive lists of, respectively, federal and provincial power).
172. The Fulton plaintiff was a power company based in Calgary. See Fulton [1981]
S.C.R. at 160.
173. See Bennett v. British Columbia [1992] 94 D.L.R. 4th 339, 340 (Can.).
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provincial commerce. Conceivably, participants in securities
transactions, such as the appellants In Bennett, would have to
change policies and practices at the border in light of other
provinces' standards.174
Moreover, the Bennett court could have sounded the Brit-
ish Columbia Securities Act's death knell by applying prong
five of the dormant commerce clause analysis-the Act most
certainly had necessary and inevitable extraterritorial effects.
The Bennett appellants had no choice but to change some as-
pect of their out-of-province behavior. They had to ensure that
if they used the CATS system in another province to access a
trader within British Columbia, their practices, which might
have been perfectly acceptable in their forum province, were
acceptable under the British Columbia Securities Act as well.
Arguably, neither of the above two provincial measures
would have survived had they been state measures in the
United States. This despite the fact that the U.S. Constitution is
considerably less textually focused on a powerful federal gov-
ernment than its Canadian counterpart. 175
V. CONCLUSION
A proverbial saying admonishes us to let sleeping dogs lie.
But should we remain passive when those dogs are needed to
guard and protect their owners? U.S. courts have answered
that question in the negative, by awakening the dormant com-
merce clause to prevent states from establishing economic bar-
riers at their borders.
Canadian courts, in contrast, have wielded solely the para-
mountcy clause, which voids provincial legislation when it directly
conflicts with federal legislation. This timidity, however, causes
courts to shy away from finding conflicts. 176 They allow their
174. Truckers would have had to do this in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines had the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the state statute requiring a certain type of mudflap. See Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 522-23, 530 (1959). The Court struck that statute
and arguably the Canadian Supreme Court should have given the British Columbia Secu-
rities Act its internment as well. See id. at 529.
175. See supra Part II.A-B.
176. Moreover, if the federal government dislikes a piece of provincial legislation, it
cannot rely on the courts to strike it, even if it is truly offensive. Instead, the government
must enact its own legislation and hope the courts will find it contrary to its provincial
counterpart.
[Vol.20:193220
1997] Awakening Canada's Dormant Commerce Clause 221
sleeping dog, i.e., their trade and commerce clause, 177 to remain
dormant. Meanwhile, provinces freely enclose themselves within
protective economic barriers.
This is the Canadian framers' nightmare vision. They feared
the secession of the southern U.S. states would inspire similar ac-
tion in Canadian provinces. In light of recent events in Quebec,
their fear forecasted the future. Canadian courts should, there-
fore, employ the dormant commerce clause or an appropriately
adapted Canadian version to halt any further economic provincial
protectionism or separatism.
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